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Abstract 
 
This paper explores how managers’ and supervisors’ equity incentives impact the likelihood of 
committing corporate fraud in Chinese-listed firms. Previous research has shown that corporate 
fraud in China is a widespread phenomenon and has severe consequences for affected firms and 
executives. However, our understanding of the reasons fraud is committed in a Chinese setting 
have been very limited thus far. This is an increasingly important topic, because corporate 
governance is rapidly changing in China, and it is unclear whether adopting the executive 
compensation practices of the West is appropriate for Chinese firms. We show that managers’ 
equity incentives increase their propensity to commit corporate fraud. We also find that this 
effect is more pronounced for state-owned firms. However, we find a negative but not significant 
relationship between the equity incentives of the supervisory board and the incidence of fraud. 
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Introduction 
Corporate fraud is a serious threat to financial markets. Previous literature has identified 
managers’ equity incentives as one potential cause of fraud. The basic notion behind this 
relationship is that the fraudulent behavior, before it is discovered and announced, may increase 
a firm’s stock price and risk, and therefore the value of an executive’s equity portfolio.  
A wide range of literature has explored the relationship between equity incentives and 
corporate fraud. However, the results of these studies are mixed. Additionally, these studies have 
focused on the U.S., whereas the Chinese economy, which features unique forms of ownership 
structure and corporate governance, has been left unexplored.  
Despite major improvements in their legal framework, corporate fraud in China continues 
to be widespread, potentially hindering economic development (Tian, 2008; Huang and Rice, 
2012). Chinese-listed companies are well known for behavior such as inflating profits, creating 
fictitious transactions, and making false disclosures (Chen et al., 2006). Corporate fraud weakens 
the efficiency of the financial markets (Ball, 2009), and has extremely negative consequences for 
firms. For example, announcements of fraud can dramatically affect firm value. Chen et al. 
(2005) report that firms can lose, on average, 15% to 25% of their value as a result of 
enforcement actions taken by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) or the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.1 Fraud generally weakens trust in firm disclosures as 
well, and it increases uncertainty about financial statements, which ultimately leads to higher 
costs of raising capital (Graham et al., 2008).  
The factors that lead to corporate fraud in China have not yet been studied extensively. 
Several researchers have found that board composition and ownership structure can affect the 
incidence of fraud (Chen et al., 2006; Jia et al., 2009; Hou and Moore, 2010).  Managers’ equity 
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incentives, which are intended to control risk-taking behavior and align long-term investment 
policies with shareholders’ interests, may also have an impact. The popularity of incentive-based 
components in executive compensation in China has grown dramatically in recent years. But we 
cannot yet fully determine whether specific components of executive compensation encourage 
fraudulent activity.  
Our goal here instead is to examine the factors preceding corporate fraud in China, and to 
provide evidence that will help to advance further research on this topic. In particular, we study 
whether the equity incentives of management and the supervisory board promote corporate fraud 
activities in Chinese-listed firms. We define fraudulent firms as those facing enforcement actions 
by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and other regulatory authorities in 
response to company and individual violations that relate to financial misreporting and 
disclosure.  
Studying equity incentives and fraud, in general and specifically in China, is important 
for many reasons. First, according to a recent report in The Economist,2 the Chinese economy is 
now responsible for almost 50% of worldwide GDP growth. Second, China has a rapidly 
growing capital market that has also become one of the world’s major financial markets. Third, 
Chinese authorities have encouraged the adoption of Western practices regarding executive 
compensation driven by stock performance. This raises the question of whether equity-based pay 
is appropriate for Chinese executives under existing legal standards, particularly in light of recent 
corporate scandals in the West.  
Our study is based on the sample of firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges from 2000 through 2010. We test the effect of equity incentives on the likelihood of 
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committing corporate fraud while controlling for ownership characteristics and corporate 
governance mechanisms specific to China. 
We find a significant and positive relationship between the equity incentives of 
management and corporate fraud. This evidence is consistent with other studies finding that 
equity incentives for management can fuel corporate fraud. However, we find a negative but not 
significant relationship between equity incentives of supervisory board members and corporate 
fraud. Furthermore, our further analysis reveals that the effect of equity incentives on corporate 
fraud is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than in non-SOEs. This result may 
be attributable to the fact that SOE management is more constrained from affecting their level of 
compensation, and weaker monitoring creates more opportunities to commit fraud. Therefore, 
SOE management may have stronger incentives, and lower expected costs, to fraudulently affect 
stock prices and increase wealth.  
Our paper contributes to the existing literature on corporate fraud in China in the 
following ways. First, the results in the previous literature studying the effect of equity incentives 
on corporate fraud are mixed. On the one hand, a positive effect has been found in, for example, 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Burns and Kedia (2006), and Armstrong et al. (2013). On the 
other hand, Erickson et al. (2006) and Armstrong et al. (2010) document no effect of equity 
incentives on corporate fraud. Therefore, we believe additional evidence is important.  
Second, although fraud itself has been studied extensively, the effect of equity incentives 
on corporate fraud has only been studied in developed countries. China, as an emerging market, 
differs from developed countries along many dimensions (institutional setting, ownership 
structure), and offers a quite unique research setting. Previous literature found that the 
phenomenon of corporate fraud in China differs significantly from that in developed countries 
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(Cumming et al., 2011). Therefore, we believe that China provides a rich environment in which 
to study the role of equity incentives, especially as it has gradually introduced many of the same 
executive compensation structures commonly found in Western economies.  
Third, the impact of state ownership on the relationship between equity incentives and 
corporate fraud has not been studied before. China again offers a unique setting for this topic 
because more than half of Chinese-listed firms remain state-owned. Also, the Chinese state is 
exceptionally influential in both the legal and regulatory systems, affecting judicial and 
regulatory independence (Allen et al., 2005). This creates a potential conflict of interest that has 
serious consequences for internal and external corporate governance mechanisms and can 
aggravate agency problems, especially under the unique two-tier board system in China.  
 Fourth, how the equity incentives of the supervisory board affect corporate fraud has not 
been studied before. There is a common view that supervisory boards of Chinese-listed firms are 
not effective. The literature has examined the role of the board in deterring corporate fraud, and 
found mixed results (Jia et al., 2009). However, the question that we examine here is: are 
supervisors’ equity incentives leading to better monitoring of management, or are they providing 
incentives to cooperate with management for their own benefit (e.g., poorer monitoring) in the 
form of inflated stockholdings?  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss previous 
literature and we develop testable hypotheses. We cover sample selection and describe our 
variables in section 3. In section 4, we explain our research design, and in section 5, we report 
our results. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
Previous literature and hypotheses development  
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Executive compensation, equity incentives, and corporate fraud 
 
The unique ownership structure and corporate governance of Chinese-listed firms have an effect 
on executive pay practices (Firth et al., 2006, 2007a). 3  Despite the significant differences 
between China and the U.S., Conyon and He (2011) have found that compensation practices in 
both countries share many similarities. For example, they find that firm size and performance are 
the main drivers of executive pay in China, likewise in the U.S. However, executive 
compensation in the West has also been linked to fraudulent behavior (e.g., Harris and Bromiely, 
2007).  
Conyon and He (2014) study the consequences of corporate fraud on executive 
compensation in China. They show that the “fixed” part of executive compensation (e.g., base 
salary, bonus, and stipends) tends to decrease after the announcement of an enforcement action 
by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Other studies analyzing the 
determinants of corporate fraud have highlighted the importance of corporate oversight and 
ownership (Chen et al., 2006; Hou and Moore, 2010; Firth et al., 2011). Yet, none of these 
studies have explored the effect of equity incentives in the form of executive stockholdings on 
corporate fraud. 
Stock-based compensation has become increasingly important in Chinese firms.4 Several 
studies claim that Chinese-listed firms have been encouraged to adopt Western management 
practices with respect to discipline and incentives (Firth et al., 2007a; Bryson et al., 2014).5 
However, equity-based compensation is generally believed to better align the interests of 
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managers and shareholders, although, in certain circumstances, it may also motivate management 
to engage in fraudulent activities.  
 Equity incentives are designed to align the interests of a risk-averse manager with those 
of diversified shareholders in order to ensure the manager will undertake all positive net present 
value risky projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Yet, it is argued that performance-based 
incentives can also induce managers to misreport performance, because they may benefit from 
the upside potential of increased stock price. Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) show that managers 
may also have incentives to misreport performance, irrespective of the vesting period. For 
example, if they are not yet able to sell shares, they may misreport to decrease the cost of capital.  
Goldman and Slezak (2006) argue that the optimal pay-for-performance sensitivity, 
maximizing firm value, is a trade-off between the benefits arising from managerial effort and the 
cost of inflating firm performance. Their model implies that pay-for-performance sensitivity 
increases the possibility of manipulation. Similarly, Peng and Roell (2008b) assert that 
performance-based compensation induces both managerial effort and manipulation.  
Thus, the theoretical literature states that fraud can be induced by performance-based 
compensation. However, note that, despite the large branch of empirical literature that examines 
how equity incentives affect corporate fraud, overall results are mixed. For example, Erickson et 
al. (2006) find no evidence that equity incentives are associated with fraud. Similarly, Armstrong 
et al. (2010) show that accounting manipulation is less likely in firms where CEOs have high 
equity incentives.  
In contrast, Burns and Kedia (2006) show that the sensitivity of a CEO’s option portfolio 
to stock prices is positively correlated with financial report restatements. Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006) show that CEOs are more likely to manipulate reported earnings when granted 
7 
 
high equity incentives. Denis et al. (2006) assert a significantly positive link between the 
likelihood of fraud allegations and stock option intensity, while Harris and Bromiley (2007) find 
empirical support for the notion that both CEO incentives and performance relative to peers can 
influence financial statement misrepresentation. Moreover, Peng and Roell (2008a) find that 
incentive pay in the form of options increases the likelihood of securities class action litigation. 
Johnson et al. (2009) add to this evidence by showing that firms committing fraud tend to offer 
greater stock incentives. Armstrong et al. (2013) show that equity incentives are positively 
correlated with misreporting when managers’ wealth is tied to their equity risk.  
Much of the earlier literature focused on CEOs’ equity incentives. But several recent 
papers have analyzed the equity incentives granted to CFOs, and how they impact the likelihood 
of fraud. For example, Feng et al. (2011) find that CFOs with higher performance-based pay are 
more likely to commit fraud. However, their motivation is not to increase wealth, but is rather 
due to pressure from their CEOs. Jiang et al. (2010) also show that financial manipulations are 
more sensitive to CFO equity-based pay than to CEO equity-based pay. 
Thus, although there is a rich set of theoretical and empirical studies on equity incentives 
and corporate fraud, the evidence remains inconclusive. The differing findings may be 
attributable to differences in equity incentive measures, sample periods, or research designs. The 
literature also offers a vivid debate on how to measure equity incentives. Early studies have used 
stockholding or option intensities to proxy for equity incentives. Later studies argue that fraud is 
related to a manager’s portfolio sensitivity to stock prices (portfolio delta), while others have 
found that sensitivity to stock volatility (portfolio vega) is the appropriate incentive measure.  
Furthermore, the measures of fraudulent behavior also differ. Some studies focus on 
litigation and regulatory enforcement actions, while others concentrate on restatements or 
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earnings management. The results can also be sensitive to the econometric specification used, 
i.e., matching versus regression. Lastly, most of the papers examine data for Western economies. 
Emerging countries like China, with its unique ownership structure and corporate governance, 
remain relatively unexplored. Therefore, the focus of this paper is to examine the relationship 
between equity incentives and corporate fraud in China. 
The literature cited above suggests that implementation of equity incentives must ensure 
a balance between the positive and negative consequences. Performance-based components may 
provide incentives to risk-averse managers to take on riskier investment projects, but they may 
also increase the likelihood of corporate fraud. This notion is based on the fact that fraudulent 
behavior may inflate stock prices, and thus the value of managers’ stockholdings as well. 
Managers may profit from fraud by selling their shares at inflated prices. Johnson et al. (2009) 
show that executives tend to sell more shares during periods of fraud than during normal periods. 
Managers whose wealth is the most sensitive to stock price changes can benefit the most from 
fraudulent behavior. 
This is in line with Becker (1968) and Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), who suggest that 
agents commit fraud only if the benefits exceed the cost of getting caught and punished. If the 
latter is lower than the wealth increase, the individual will have a stronger incentive to engage in 
fraudulent activities. China is a developing country with institutions and a legal environment that 
have lagged behind the rapid development of its financial markets (Chen et al., 2005). Therefore, 
the expected cost of being caught and punished is likely to be relatively low. We thus 
hypothesize that managers may wish to affect investor perceptions of their company, and hence 
their stock prices. Therefore, our main hypothesis is to expect that management equity incentives 
will enhance corporate fraud. 
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H1 The effect of management equity incentives on corporate fraud is positive. 
 
Corporate governance of Chinese-listed firms 
 
Despite the major regulatory shifts toward Western standards, the institutional setting and 
corporate governance mechanisms in China remain quite different than those in other countries. 
For example, Chinese companies have a specific governance system that incorporates features of 
both a U.S.-style single board and a German-style two-tier board. They thus have both a board of 
directors and a supervisory board (Jia et al., 2009).  
 The board of director’s main responsibilities are fairly similar to those of its U.S. 
counterpart (Cho and Rui, 2009). Its main role is to define and supervise long-term investment 
strategies. It also decides on executive compensation. Board characteristics such as directors’ 
independence have been found to affect pay-for-performance sensitivity (Conyon and He, 2011).  
The role of the supervisory board, on the other hand, is to monitor management, the 
board of directors, and to oversee the firm’s financial affairs. The members of the supervisory 
board (supervisors) have access to information about the company’s operations. However, in 
contrast to management and the board of directors, they have no decision making power (Xi, 
2006).  
In general, certain board characteristics have a stronger influence on the incidence of 
fraud, such as, for example, size, independence, and CEO duality. Board size may have a double 
effect on monitoring. On the one hand, larger boards should have a better knowledge base 
(Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005); on the other hand, sizable boards are more costly and may be 
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less effective at oversight (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). Dechow et al. (1996) show that weak 
corporate governance mechanisms can create an environment of increased opportunities for 
fraud.  
In China, the state has the authority to appoint both board and supervisory members 
(Conyon and He, 2011). Theoretically, this should weaken its monitoring role. Chen et al. (2006) 
show that the presence of outside directors on the board helps to mitigate fraudulent activities in 
China. They also show that firms with CEO duality (where one individual holds both the CEO 
and chairman positions) tend to have higher incidences of fraud.6   
Moreover, individuals at various levels of the corporate hierarchy may have 
fundamentally different incentives to commit fraud. The triangle theory suggests that fraud can 
occur if individuals have 1) opportunity, 2) attitude, and 3) incentives, or feel pressured (Cressey, 
1950; Trompeter et al., 2012). We therefore distinguish among the various shareholding groups 
in a company to gauge each group’s trade-off between the benefits of committing fraud and the 
cost of getting caught and punished. Some argue that supervisors should be empowered to take 
legal action against company management if they detect misconduct (Xi, 2006). However, little 
is known about whether equity holdings of boards affect corporate fraud. We thus analyze the 
incentives to engage in fraudulent activities that may stem from supervisory board stockholdings.  
There is some tension in the literature over the efficacy of the supervisory board. For 
example, Xi (2006) reports that supervisory boards are perceived as dysfunctional in their 
monitoring roles. Other studies, however, show the opposite. Supervisory boards have the ability 
to improve the quality of accounting information in Chinese firms (Firth et al., 2007b; Cho and 
Rui, 2009).  
11 
 
Jia et al. (2009) also report that supervisory boards can serve as an active corporate 
governance mechanism. In fact, as Dahya et al. (2003) show, investors value the supervisory 
board report within financial statements, which implies that they also value the monitoring role 
performed by supervisors. Supervisory board members act as watchdogs, and have fewer 
incentives to engage in fraudulent activities. Therefore, the effect of supervisory board member 
shareholdings on corporate fraud should be negative. 
 
H2 The effect of supervisory board equity incentives on corporate fraud is negative. 
 
Ownership structure of Chinese-listed firms: SOEs and non-SOEs 
 
The ownership of Chinese companies is quite concentrated. In particular, the major blockholders 
still tend to be state institutions. State ownership in turn affects the information environment of 
public firms (Gul et al., 2010), as well as the monitoring functions of the board and external 
investors.  
More than half of Chinese-listed firms are state-owned. The impact of state ownership on 
the relationship between equity incentives and corporate fraud has not yet been studied. 
However, SOEs differ along many dimensions from non-SOEs in ways that may affect the 
monitoring mechanisms and the cost-benefit analysis of management to engage in fraudulent 
behavior. The various elements of state ownership can increase the incentives and create more 
opportunities to commit corporate fraud. 
First, SOE management has little influence over firm performance. SOEs are governed by 
the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which acts as a 
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board of directors, evaluating management performance and approving investment projects. 
Furthermore, performance evaluations, salary increases, and career advancement in SOEs often 
depend on political connections and the rank of the SOE (Du et al., 2012; Hass et al., 2014). SOE 
management also has very little power to maximize firm value or affect stockholdings. The state 
influences all of a firm’s important decisions. Therefore, SOE management may have higher 
incentives to engage in corporate fraud because it is the only direct method by which they can 
affect stock prices.   
Second, state ownership may affect both internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms by affecting the information environment of public firms. SOEs are believed to have 
weaker investor protections and more opaque financial disclosures (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
Gul et al. (2010) show in a Chinese context that the information environment of firms tends to be 
poorer when the largest shareholder is government-related. Therefore, a poor information 
environment combined with deficiencies in monitoring may lead to a situation where 
management has more opportunities to commit corporate fraud.  
 Third, regulations in the Chinese system are not always enforced consistently, and the 
consequences of committing fraud in an SOE context tend to be less severe. Hou and Moore 
(2010) suggest that fraud detection differs between SOEs and non-SOEs due to political 
connections. They show that SOEs face less scrutiny from enforcement authorities. Moreover, 
Chen et al. (2011) show that punishment for committing corporate fraud in SOEs is less severe 
and tends to be more delayed. Conyon and He (2014) find that reductions in compensation and 
management turnover in SOEs are both lower. This implies that the relative expected cost of 
committing corporate fraud in SOEs is lower than for non-SOEs.  
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Based on the above arguments, we expect that SOE management is more constrained 
from affecting stock prices and their wealth from stockholdings through performance 
improvement. Also, the expected costs of committing fraud are expected to be lower in SOEs 
because of a lower rate of detection and less severe consequences. Hence, we hypothesize that, if 
SOE managers wish to increase their own wealth through stockholdings, they may have stronger 
incentives and more opportunities to engage in fraudulent activities than their non-SOE 
counterparts. 
 
H3 The effect of management equity incentives on corporate fraud is more pronounced in SOEs 
than in non-SOEs. 
 
Sample selection and variable descriptions 
 
Sample 
 
To analyze how equity incentives affect corporate fraud, we use data from the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. CSMAR contains detailed information on 
the regulatory enforcement actions against corporate fraud in Chinese-listed firms, as well as 
corporate governance mechanisms, analyst forecasts, financial data, and trading information for 
listed firms on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. The data come directly from 
public firms' annual financial reports and from major CSRC announcements, and have also been 
used in previous studies on executive compensation and corporate fraud (e.g., Firth et al., 2006, 
2007a; and Conyon and He, 2011, 2014).  
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We note that it can be difficult to precisely measure corporate fraud. Our sample of fraud 
firms comes from the CSRC Enforcement Actions Research Database. It consists of firms listed 
on both exchanges that were subject to enforcement actions by the CSRC and regulatory 
authorities from 2000-2010. The potential limitation of this and previous studies is that the 
detected and disclosed fraud is only a small subset of total fraud. Furthermore, in the specific 
context of China, fraud detection as we noted may be lower in SOEs than in non-SOEs because 
of political motivations (Hou and Moore, 2010). However, this effect should be mitigated by the 
introduction of the new “Solutions for Listed Firms Checks” regulation in 2001 that increased the 
general severity of the regulatory environment (Hou and Moore, 2010).  
Overall, our sample consists of 309 firms that faced enforcement actions by regulatory 
institutions. Note that firms can face enforcement actions for reasons that are not attributable to 
firm management. We therefore follow prior literature (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2010), and include 
only cases involving inflated profits, asset fabrications, disclosure postponements, false 
statements, major failures in information disclosures, and only those where the object of 
punishment was management, the firm, or both. We exclude cases of illegal share buybacks, 
major shareholder embezzlement, price manipulation, fraudulent listings, illegal guarantees, and 
illegal speculation. 
We count enforcement actions against the same firm, management, or both, and within 
the same year, as one observation. However, a particular fraud can occur over several years. We 
therefore follow Peng and Roell (2008a) and use a stricter definition of fraud. We set our 
indicator variable Fraud to 1 only for the year that the fraudulent activity began.  
We first compare the incentives of management and supervisors resulting from 
stockholdings and cash compensation in fraud firms to matched non-fraud firms with similar 
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metrics based on firm size for each year and industry pair. We test the effect of equity incentives 
on the likelihood of corporate fraud by controlling for ownership characteristics, corporate 
governance, and firm characteristics. We obtain data on: 1) all firms from the CSMAR China 
Stock Market Financial Statements Database, 2) external corporate governance from the 
CSMAR China Listed Firm's Corporate Governance Research Database, and 3) stock market 
information from the CSMAR China Stock Market Trading Database. Further details on variable 
definitions and data sources are in Appendix A. 
 
Incentive Measurement 
 
Executive compensation typically consists of a fixed part in the form of cash and performance-
based pay that may include 1) an incentive component to align future salary increases with firm 
performance, or 2) equity-based incentives that can be granted in various forms contingent on a 
firm’s stock. Our primary goal is to examine how the equity incentives of management and the 
supervisory board affect corporate fraud. 
Equity incentives are usually calculated as pay-performance sensitivities, so that the 
compensation package is somewhat dependent on firm performance. Furthermore, to measure 
incentives, it is generally accepted to compute a $1 change in the portfolio, including executive 
stock or option values, for a 1% change in stock price (Core and Guay, 2002; Erickson et al., 
2006). 
As we noted earlier, in China, the details of performance-based compensation have been 
disclosed since 2005. However, currently available data suggest that most incentive plans have 
not yet been fully implemented, so we use a different proxy to measure equity incentives. The 
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Securities Act 1999 (Article 61) required Chinese-listed firms to disclose the resumes of all 
directors, supervisors, and top managers, along with their shareholdings in the company, in their 
annual reports (Li et al., 2013). Due to the inherent data limitations, we use these stockholdings 
as the measure of equity incentives. Following Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Aggarwal (2007), 
we measure equity incentives as explicit pay-to-performance sensitivities from stockholdings; in 
particular, we take the stockholdings as a fraction of the total equity outstanding. 
To proxy for the equity incentives of supervisors and management, we use the following 
variables: 1) the supervisors’ share (the number of shares held by the Board of Supervisors, 
including the Chairman, over total equity), and 2) management’s share (the number of shares 
held by management, including the general manager, the president, CEO, assistant general 
manager, the vice president, secretary to the board of directors, and other directors, over total 
equity). 
 
Control Variables 
 
Besides the main independent variables, in order to control for the fixed part of executive 
compensation in a form of cash, we include the sum of the total annual salaries of the directors, 
supervisors, and executives. We also include internal and external corporate governance 
measures and firm characteristics.  
To control for various characteristics of the internal corporate governance mechanisms, 
we use the following variables. Supervisory Board Size and Board Size capture the number of 
board members (Chen et al., 2006). Independent represents the number of independent directors 
as a fraction of all directors (Beasley, 1996; Cornett et al., 2008). Dual Role is an indicator 
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variable equal to 1 if an individual holds the CEO and chairperson positions simultaneously, and 
0 otherwise (Efendi et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2009). Ownership is the Herfindahl Index of 
ownership concentration that is calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of shares owned 
by the top ten shareholders (Jia et al., 2009). We use Number of Analysts to proxy for the 
external oversight of a firm (Cumming et al., 2011). 
We also include firm characteristics in our regression. To control for a firm's growth 
opportunities, we use Market-to-Book. We include Leverage to represent total long-term debt 
over total assets. As a company performance measure, we use Return on Assets (RoA), and we 
control for the possibility of rent extraction. Following Dechow et al. (1996), we calculate the 
variable Free-Cash-Flow. Then, following Erickson et al. (2006), we use Altman’s (1968) Z-
score measure to proxy for the risk of financial distress. We also include Firm Size, which is the 
logarithm of total market value. 
Ndofor et al. (2013) find that information asymmetries arising from industry- and firm-
level complexities increase the probability of top managers committing financial reporting fraud. 
Thus, each regression model also contains a set of industry fixed-effects variables to capture 
industry variations. We base each industry classification on the CSRC’s industry classification 
codes. Finally, we include a set of time dummies to capture year effects. The definition and 
source of the variables used in the analysis are in Appendix A. 
 
Research design 
 
Our research design follows prior research. We first examine the effect of equity incentives on 
corporate fraud based on matched-sample and regression analyses. We follow previous studies 
18 
 
such as Erickson et al. (2006), Efendi et al. (2007), Jia et al. (2009), Hou and Moore (2010), and 
Armstrong et al. (2013) to create a matched-sample based on an outcome-based matching 
procedure. In particular, we form matched pairs of fraud to non-fraud firms based on industry 
and firm size. For every fraud firm, we find a non-fraud firm in the same industry that is closest 
in size, where all variables are measured in the year before the fraud was committed. This design 
allows us to compare fraudulent activities between fraud and non-fraud firms with similar 
characteristics. Next, to perform our regression analysis, we estimate the following logistic 
model: 
 
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜽 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜷 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
 
where Fraud is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the first year a firm engaged in a fraud that 
was subject to a regulatory enforcement, and 0 otherwise, Incentives is a vector of variables 
related to the components of compensation cash, supervisor shares, and management shares, 
Controls is a vector of control variables, including those in both internal and external corporate 
governance and firm-level characteristics (all defined in the Appendix). We adjust standard 
errors to compute statistical significance for heteroscedasticity. 
 
Results 
 
Descriptive statistics 
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Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the matched sample of firms in panel A. Panel B 
breaks down our sample between fraud and non-fraud firms. Panel C gives a breakdown by SOE 
and non-SOE. 
We first provide some information about the size and composition of compensation for 
management and supervisors. Management is paid on average a fixed salary of U.S. $1.3 million. 
If we examine their equity incentives in more detail, we find that management holds on average 
0.88% of shares, which is equal to U.S. $3.9 million. In comparison, supervisors hold only 
0.06% of shares, which are worth approximately U.S. $0.2 million. Therefore, equity incentives 
form a major part of management’s total compensation, but only a very small part of supervisor 
compensation.  
Panel B shows the descriptive statistics separately for fraud and non-fraud firms, matched 
by size and industry. We find that fraud firm management tends to have higher equity incentives 
than the matched non-fraud firm management. However, non-fraud firm supervisors have higher 
equity incentives than those of fraud firms. Finally, as panel C of Table 1 shows, SOEs are 
fundamentally different than non-SOEs in our sample. 
 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for the main variables used in our study. Note that 
fraud exhibits a significantly negative correlation with cash payments. However, the percentage 
of shares held by management has a significantly positive correlation with corporate fraud 
activities. Among other things, the fraction of independent directors, leverage, and firm size are 
all statistically negatively correlated with corporate fraud activities. 
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[Please insert Table 2 here] 
 
Overall, the correlations highlight the fact that the impact of different compensation 
components for individuals at different levels of the corporate hierarchy can vary tremendously. 
A comparison between SOEs and non-SOEs also shows significant differences between these 
two types of firms. SOE directors, supervisors, and executives tend to have a smaller cash 
component to their compensation and less equity compensation than non-SOEs (which is 
consistent with Conyon and He, 2011). Nevertheless, these tests are not fully informative, 
because we have not yet controlled for other factors. The next section describes our multivariate 
analyzes in more detail. 
 
Empirical analyses 
 
In this section, we explore the empirical results for our different models. First, Table 3 presents 
the empirical results for the matched sample of firms.7 We then divide it into two subsamples: 
SOEs (Table 4) and non-SOEs (Table 5). Furthermore, we present additional results of the 
sensitivity analysis (Table 6), and the results for the full sample (Table 7).  
Table 3 reports the results from a panel logistic regression for the relationship between 
equity incentives and corporate fraud for the matched sample of firms. In model 1, we show 
separately the relationship between cash and management equity incentives and the propensity to 
commit fraud. In models 2 and 3, we test the effect of cash and performance-based incentives of 
management on corporate fraud while controlling for corporate governance mechanisms and 
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firm characteristics, respectively. In models 4 and 5, we examine the link between cash and the 
shareholdings of the supervisory board and management and fraud, while controlling for 
corporate governance and firm characteristics, respectively. Model 6 shows the relationship 
between the fixed and equity-based components and fraud, while controlling simultaneously for 
corporate governance and firm characteristics. 
Table 3 shows that higher equity incentives for management lead to a higher propensity 
to commit corporate fraud, which is consistent with our Hypothesis 1. This holds across all our 
models. Equity incentives are also economically significant. A 1-standard-deviation increase in 
equity incentives for managers increases the likelihood of fraud activity by 2.78%-3.09%. We 
also find that cash compensation has a negative and statistically significant effect on the 
probability of committing corporate fraud. A higher fixed salary reduces the incentives to 
commit fraud, which is in line with theoretical predictions. We find no evidence that the equity 
incentives of supervisors affect the propensity to commit fraud, however. But we cannot gauge 
whether this is due to more limited opportunities to commit fraud, or to the relatively small 
absolute value of the incentives. Note that certain governance characteristics, such as larger 
supervisory boards and more concentrated ownership, can serve to deter incidences of corporate 
fraud.  
 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
 
Our comparison results in panel C of Table 1 indicate that SOEs and non-SOEs differ 
dramatically in terms of corporate governance and firm characteristics. We therefore divide our 
sample by SOEs (Table 4) and non-SOEs (Table 5). The result indicates that the relationship 
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between the equity incentives of managers and the propensity to commit corporate fraud is 
stronger in SOEs, which is in line with our prediction in Hypothesis 3. Using overall average 
shareholdings by managers, we find that a 1-standard deviation increase in equity incentives for 
SOE managers increases the likelihood of fraud by 3.34%-3.99%, compared to only 2.13%-
2.51% for non-SOE managers. Again, we find no evidence that higher supervisor equity 
incentives increase the propensity to commit fraud. Also, the effects of corporate governance 
characteristics are similar for both SOEs and non-SOEs. 
 
[Please insert Table 4 and Table 5 here] 
 
Robustness tests 
 
Table 6 presents additional robustness tests for our matched sample. In model 1, we include the 
number of analysts as an additional control variable to proxy for external corporate governance. 
We find weak evidence that it deters corporate fraud and that the economic effect of 
management shareholdings on corporate fraud is lower. Therefore, it may partially support 
Cumming et al. (2011) finding that analysts are efficient at mitigating corporate fraud.  
Model 2 presents the results with a High Litigation Risk (HLR) dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if the firm is in the computer or a related manufacturing, medical manufacturing, 
chemical, or retail industry (Kim and Skinner, 2012). In these industries, supervisory boards 
have been particularly effective at curbing fraud. 
Models 3 and 4 give the results for subsamples based on firm size. Consistent with our 
previous results, we note that the magnitude of the effect of management shareholdings on 
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corporate fraud is larger in smaller firms. We also observe that the boards of directors in larger 
firms may not be as efficient in their monitoring role as those in smaller firms. 
Models 5 and 6 present the results for subsamples based on supervisory board size. 
Interestingly, our results suggest that supervisory boards with more than four members are very 
effective in their monitoring role. 
Model 7 shows our results for using a stricter definition of the Fraud dummy, where we 
only include the first fraud a company has committed. We also find a positive and statistically 
significant effect of management shareholdings on corporate fraud.  
Models 8 and 9 present the results for the subsamples before and after the 2005 split 
share reform. Prior to the 2005 reform, the shares of SOEs were typically non-tradable. In 2005, 
Chinese authorities announced the elimination of non-tradable shares by the end of 2006 (Hou et 
al., 2013). Cumming et al. (2012) report that this reform had an effect on the incentives of 
managers to misreport performance. After the reform, they find that CEO turnover following 
corporate fraud disclosures increased. We find that, before the reform, the effect of management 
shareholdings was insignificant. This effect may be driven by the fact that SOE shares were non-
tradable before the split-share reform, so management had less of an incentive to misreport 
performance because their wealth was fixed. When the SOE shares became tradable after the 
reform, we find a significant and statistically significant effect of management shareholdings on 
corporate fraud. 
Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011) claim that product market competition can act as an 
external corporate governance mechanism. Models 10 and 11 present the results for the 
subsamples of firms operating in concentrated and competitive industries, respectively. We 
define the industry concentration based on the Herfindahl Hirschman Competition Index (HHI), 
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where HHI (Low) and HHI (High) mean that HHI is greater/equal than median value and less 
than the median value. HHI (High) means that HHI is greater/equal than the median value and 
less than the median value. Equity incentives have a significantly positive effect on corporate 
fraud in both competitive and non-competitive industries. We also find that the equity incentive 
of supervisors decreases the probability of corporate fraud, but only in non-competitive 
industries. This provides support for the argument that corporate governance is of greater 
consequence in non-competitive markets.   
There are differences in economic and institutional development across regions in China. 
Firth et al. (2011) report that coastal regions are more developed than the western and inland 
provinces. They point out that the view of ethics, law system, and executives experience might 
differ across regions. Therefore, the incentives and the expected cost of committing corporate 
fraud might depend on where the firm is located. Managers of firm located in low development 
regions might face lower expected costs of being punished due to weak institutional and legal 
system.  
We use and index of regional development that measures market intermediaries and legal 
environment (MLS). Models 12 and 13 show the results for the subsamples of firms operating in 
regions with different development. Model 12 presents the results for regions with higher market 
and legal development, where MLS > 5.5, i.e. above the median value of the MLS index. Model 
13 presents the results for regions with lower market and legal development, where MLS <= 5.5.  
We find that the relationship between equity incentives and corporate fraud is more pronounced 
in less developed regions. This supports the intuition that the expected costs of committing 
corporate fraud might be lower in less developed regions.  
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[Please insert Table 6 here] 
 
Table 7 shows the results of additional robustness tests for the unmatched sample. The 
results are similar to those for the matched sample. They confirm the previously documented 
result of a positive and statistically significant effect of management stockholdings. In the 
unmatched sample, we also find a negative and statistically significant effect of cash pay on 
corporate fraud. Furthermore, our results confirm that firm size and the debt ratio lower the 
probability of committing corporate fraud, as well as the importance of supervisory board and 
ownership concentration in mitigating corporate fraud for the full and SOE sample. 
 
[Please insert Table 7 here] 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
The Chinese economy has experienced unprecedented growth and the rapid development of 
financial markets. However, the future growth and viability of Chinese-listed firms may be 
overshadowed by corporate fraud. Chinese regulatory authorities are charged with monitoring 
the economy, and they regularly update reporting standards in order to improve transparency and 
prevent fraud. However, fraud may also be a byproduct of the introduction of performance-based 
compensation packages, which were previously more common in Western economies. Chinese 
companies have become increasingly more Western-oriented in setting compensation packages 
and in using incentive-based components. Although stock options were not permitted until 2006, 
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Chinese companies had other incentives in the form of bonuses and stockholdings that have 
grown in importance over time.  
The academic literature suggests that if higher incentives are granted to executives, the 
effect may be twofold: 1) a positive effect in terms of aligning the interest and risk profile of 
managers and shareholders, and 2) a negative effect in terms of managerial behavior, which can 
lead to an increased propensity to commit corporate fraud. Moreover, corporate scandals in the 
West (e.g., Enron, WorldCom) have shown that increased incidences of fraudulent accounting 
disclosures may occur in cultures driven by stock price performance. 
Following this wave of corporate scandals, Western regulators introduced severe 
penalties for fraudulent behavior. However, there is an ongoing and dynamic discussion of 
whether stricter regulations actually achieve the desired goal. Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) 
report that lax accounting and legal environments can increase the incidence of misreporting and 
consequently distortions in capital allocations. Goldman and Slezak’s (2006) model implies that, 
if the penalty for manipulation is increased, it may actually induce corporate fraud, because 
corporate monitoring may become less vigilant in light of more complex regulating policies. 
However, Chinese authorities have generally tried to encourage incentive-based 
compensation. For example, the Code of Corporate Governance for listed firms in China (CSRS 
2002, article 18, chapter 2) stipulates that management should be chosen competitively, and that 
compensation should include incentive pay. Nonetheless, the important question for the Chinese 
economy is whether equity incentives should be promoted to the extent that they are in, e.g., 
Western economies, where they have been identified as potential causes of corporate fraud.  
In light of corporate fraud in China, our main goal here was to examine whether equity 
incentives enhance the incidence of corporate fraud in Chinese-listed firms. Although the data on 
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incentives and their impact are somewhat limited, we use various proxies to measure incentives 
such as cash and management and supervisory board shareholdings. Our main findings suggest a 
clear and robust pattern of a positive and statistically significant effect of management equity 
incentives on corporate fraud. Note, however, that the magnitude of the effect is higher in SOEs 
than in non-SOEs. Therefore, it may be more desirable to encourage private ownership of 
Chinese firms. We do not find any strong association between equity incentives and corporate 
fraud for supervisory board members.  
Given that the importance of performance-based incentives has grown gradually in 
China, we believe future research should pay particular attention to the individual incentives of 
various management team members, such as, e.g., the CEO or the CFO, and attempt to verify 
whether the causes of corporate fraud are related to performance-based compensation on the 
various levels of the corporate hierarchy.  
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Appendix  
Table A. Variable Definitions 
Variable Name                  Definition [Source] 
Fraud A dummy variable equals to 1 for the year of a firm is subject to a 
regulatory enforcement against fraud, and 0 otherwise [CSRC's 
Enforcement Actions Research Database] 
Cash                    Log of total annual emolument of directors, supervisors and 
executives [China Listed Firm's Corporate Governance Research 
Database] 
Supervisors 
Share (%) 
Percentage of shares held by board of supervisors [China Listed Firm's 
Corporate Governance Research Database] 
Management 
Shares (%) 
Percentage of shares held by management [China Listed Firm's 
Corporate Governance Research Database] 
Supervisor 
Board Size   
Total number of supervisors [China Listed Firm's Corporate 
Governance Research Database] 
Board Size Total number of directors [China Listed Firm's Corporate Governance 
Research Database] 
Independent 
(%) 
Percentage of independent directors as fraction of number of 
independent directors divided by number of total board members 
[China Listed Firm's Corporate Governance Research Database] 
Dual Role               A dummy equals 1 if the firms' CEO and the board chairman are not 
the same person and 0 otherwise [China Listed Firm's Corporate 
Governance Research Database] 
Ownership               Herfindahl index of ownership concentration is calculated as the sum 
of squared percentage of shares owned by the top 10 shareholders 
[China Listed Firm's Corporate Governance Research Database] 
Number of 
Analysts  
The number of financial analysts following the firm [China Stock 
Market Financial Database] 
Market-to-
Book          
The market value of the company over book value [CSMAR China 
Stock Market Financial Statements Database and CSMAR China 
Stock Market Trading Database] 
Leverage                Total long-term debt over total asset [CSMAR China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database] 
RoA                     Return on asset [CSMAR China Stock Market Financial Statements 
Database] 
Free-Cash-
Flow          
Measure of company's desire for external financing of Dechow et al. 
(1996) [CSMAR China Stock Market Financial Statements Database] 
Zscore                  Altman’s (1968) Z-score [CSMAR China Stock Market Financial 
Statements Database]  
Firm Size               Log of total market value at the end of the year [CSMAR China Stock 
Market Trading Database] 
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Notes
                                                          
1U.S. evidence shows negative abnormal returns on the announcement day of an enforcement 
action by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (see Feroz et al., 1991; and 
Dechow et al., 1996). Moreover, Karpoff et al. (2008) estimate that firms can lose, on average, 
38% of their market value as a result of SEC enforcement actions. 
2www.economist.com. Accessed on December 21, 2013. 
3 For a discussion on the regulatory framework and institutional setting please see Chen et al. 
(2006). 
4 In 2006, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) published the Trial Procedures for the implementation of stock-
based incentives in SOEs (Li et al., 2013). In 2007, the CSRC updated their regulations and 
required the disclosure of compensation committee duties, and the implementation of stock-
based incentive plans (Li et al., 2013). 
5 See Firth et al. 2006 for a review of executive pay history in China.  
6  It is interesting to note that recent empirical evidence suggests external governance 
mechanisms are important in China. Chen et al. (2014) find that analyst coverage can mitigate 
instances of fraud in Chinese-listed companies. This effect is particularly important for non-
SOEs because they are more dependent, with respect to financing needs, on capital markets than 
SOEs. Moreover, Chen et al. (2013) report that the presence of auditors can serve as an external 
governance mechanism that also mitigates the fraudulent behavior of executives. 
30 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 We present the results based on the sample matched by industry and size. However, we also 
matched the sample based on the propensity score method used by Armstrong et al. (2010), and 
found very similar results.  
31 
 
References 
Aggarwal, R. K. (2007). Chapter 17 - Executive compensation and incentives, in B. E. Eckbo, 
ed.: Handbook of Empirical Corporate Finance. pp. 497-538 (Elsevier). 
Allen, F., Qian J., & Qian M. J. (2005). Law, finance, and economic growth in China. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 77(1), 57–116. 
Altman, E. I., (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate 
bankruptcy. Journal of Finance, 23(4), 589-609. 
Armstrong, C. S., Jagolinzer A. D., & Larcker D. F. (2010). Chief executive officer equity 
incentives and accounting irregularities. Journal of Accounting Research, 48(2), 225-271. 
Armstrong, C. S., Larcker D. F., Ormazabal G., & Taylor D. J. (2013). The relation between 
equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 109(2), 327-350. 
Ball, R. (2009). Market and political/regulatory perspectives on the recent accounting scandals. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 47(2), 277-323. 
Bar-Gill, O., & Bebchuk L. (2003). Misreporting corporate performance, Harvard Law and 
Economics Discussion Paper. 
Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director 
composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71(4), 443-465. 
Bergstresser, D., & Philippon, T. (2006). CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 80(3), 511-529. 
Bryson, A., Forth, J., & Zhou, M. (2014). Same or different? The CEO labour market in China's 
public listed companies. The Economic Journal, 124, F90-F108. 
Burns, N., & Kedia, S. (2006). The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 79(1), 35-67. 
32 
 
Chen, G., Firth, M., Gao, D. N., & Rui, O. M. (2005). Is China’s securities regulatory agency a 
toothless tiger? Evidence from enforcement actions. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 24(6), 451-488. 
Chen, G., Firth, M., Gao, D. N., & Rui, O. M. (2006). Ownership structure, corporate 
governance, and fraud: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(3), 424-
448. 
Chen, D., Jiang, D., Liang, S., & Wang, F. (2011). Selective enforcement of regulation. China 
Journal of Accounting Research, 4(1), 9-27. 
Chen, J., Cumming, D., Hou, W., & Lee, E. (2013). Executive integrity, audit opinion, and fraud 
in Chinese listed firms. Emerging Markets Review, 15, 72-91. 
Chen, J., Cumming, D., Hou, W., & Lee, E. (2014). Does the external monitoring effect of 
financial analysts deter corporate fraud in China?. Journal of Business Ethics, 
Forthcoming. 
Cheng, Q., & Warfield, T. D. (2005). Equity incentives and earnings management. The 
Accounting Review, 80(2), 441-476. 
Cho, S., & Rui, O. M. (2009). Exploring the effects of China's two-tier board system and 
ownership structure on firm performance and earnings informativeness. Asia-Pacific 
Journal of Accounting & Economics, 16(1), 95-117. 
Conyon, M. J., & He, L. (2011). Executive compensation and corporate governance in China. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(4), 1158-1175. 
Conyon, M. J., & He, L. (2014). Executive compensation and corporate fraud in China. Journal 
of Business Ethics, Forthcoming. 
33 
 
Core, J., & Guay, W. (2002). Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their 
sensitivities to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(3), 613-630. 
Cornett, M. M., Marcus, A. J., & Tehranian, H. (2008). Corporate governance and pay-for-
performance: The impact of earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 
87(2), 357-373. 
Cressey, D. R. (1950). The criminal violation of financial trust. American Sociological Review, 
15(6), 738-743. 
Cumming, D. J., Hou, W., & Lee, E. (2012). Impact of split share structure reform in China on 
CEO accountability to corporate fraud. Journal of Business Ethics, Forthcoming. 
Dahya, J., Karbhari, Y., Xiao, J. Z., & Yang, M. (2003). The usefulness of the supervisory board 
report in China. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(4), 308-321. 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences of earnings 
manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(1), 1-36. 
Denis, D. J., Hanouna, P., & Sarin, A. (2006). Is there a dark side to incentive compensation?. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(3), 467-488. 
 Du, F., Tang, G., & Young, S. M. (2012). Influence activities and favoritism in subjective 
performance evaluation: evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises. The Accounting 
Review, 87(5), 1555-1588. 
Efendi, J., Srivastava, A., & Swanson, E. P. (2007). Why do corporate managers misstate 
financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 85(3), 667-708. 
34 
 
Erickson, M., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L. (2006). Is there a link between executive equity 
incentives and accounting fraud?. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(1), 113-143. 
Feng, M., Ge, W., Luo, S., & Shevlin, T. (2011). Why do CFOs become involved in material 
accounting manipulations?. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(1), 21-36. 
Feroz, E. H., Park, K. J., & Pastena, V. (1991). The financial and market effects of the SEC's 
accounting and auditing enforcement releases. Journal of Accounting Research, 
29(Supplement), 107-142. 
 Firth, M., Fung, P. M., & Rui, O. M. (2006). Corporate performance and CEO compensation in 
China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(4), 693-714. 
Firth, M., Fung, P. M., & Rui, O. M. (2007). How ownership and corporate governance influence 
chief executive pay in China's listed firms. Journal of Business Research, 60(7), 776-785. 
Firth, M., Fung, P. M., & Rui, O. M. (2007). Ownership, two-tier board structure, and the 
informativeness of earnings–Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 26(4), 463-496. 
Firth, M., Rui, O. M., & Wu, W. (2011). Cooking the books: Recipes and costs of falsified 
financial statements in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(2), 371-390. 
Fischer, P. E., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2000). Reporting bias. The Accounting Review, 75(2), 229-
245. 
Giroud, X., & Mueller, H. M. (2010). Does corporate governance matter in competitive 
industries?. Journal of Financial Economics, 95(3), 312-331. 
Giroud, X., & Mueller, H. M. (2011). Corporate governance, product market competition, and 
equity prices. Journal of Finance, 66(2), 563-600. 
35 
 
Goldman, E., & Slezak, S. L. (2006). An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the 
presence of information manipulation. Journal of Financial Economics, 80(3), 603-626. 
Graham, J. R., Li, S., & Qiu, J. (2008). Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 89(1), 44-61. 
Gul, F. A., Kim, J. B., & Qiu, A. A. (2010). Ownership concentration, foreign shareholding, 
audit quality, and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from China. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 95(3), 425-442. 
Harris, J., & Bromiley, P. (2007). Incentives to cheat: The influence of executive compensation 
and firm performance on financial misrepresentation. Organization Science, 18(3), 350-
367. 
Hass, L.H., Johan, S., & Mueller, M. (2014). The effectiveness of public enforcement: Evidence 
from the resolution of tunneling in China. Journal of Business Ethics, Forthcoming. 
 Hou, W., & Moore, G. (2010). Player and referee roles held jointly: The effect of state 
ownership on China’s regulatory enforcement against fraud. Journal of Business Ethics 
95(2), 317-335. 
 Hou, W., Lee, E., Stathopoulos, K., & Tong, Z. (2013). Executive compensation and the split 
share structure reform in China. European Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. 
Huang, F., & Rice, J. (2012). Firm networking and bribery in China: Assessing some potential 
negative consequences of firm openness. Journal of Business Ethics, 107(4), 533-545. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4), 305-360.  
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control 
systems. Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880. 
36 
 
Jia, C., Ding, S., Li, Y., & Wu, Z. (2009). Fraud, enforcement action, and the role of corporate 
governance: Evidence from China. Journal of Business Ethics, 90(4), 561-576. 
Jiang, J. X., Petroni, K. R., & Wang, I. Y. (2010). CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most 
influence on earnings management?. Journal of Financial Economics, 96(3), 513-526. 
Johnson, S. A., Ryan, H. E., & Tian, Y. S. (2009). Managerial incentives and corporate fraud: the 
sources of incentives matter. Review of Finance, 13(1), 115-145. 
Karamanou, I., & Vafeas, N. (2005). The association between corporate boards, audit 
committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 43(3), 453-486. 
Karpoff, J. M., Lee, D. S., & Martin, G. S. (2008). The cost to firms of cooking the books. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 43(3), 581-611. 
Kim, I., & Skinner, D. J. (2012). Measuring securities litigation risk. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 53(1), 290-310. 
 Li, Y., Lou, F., Wang, J., & Yuan, H. (2013). A survey of executive compensation contracts in 
China’s listed companies. China Journal of Accounting Research, 6(3), 211-231. 
Ndofor, H. A., Wesley, C., & Priem, R. L. (2013). Providing CEOs with opportunities to cheat 
the effects of complexity-based information asymmetries on financial reporting fraud. 
Journal of Management, Forthcoming. 
Peng, L., & Röell, A. (2008a). Executive pay and shareholder litigation. Review of Finance, 
12(1), 141-184. 
Peng, L., & Röell, A. (2008b). Manipulation and equity-based compensation. American 
Economic Review, 98(2), 285-90. 
37 
 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1994). Politicians and firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
109(4), 995-1025. 
Tian, Q. (2008). Perception of business bribery in China: The impact of moral philosophy. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 80(3), 437-445. 
Trompeter, G. M., Carpenter, T. D., Desai, N., Jones, K. L., & Riley Jr, R. A. (2012). A 
synthesis of fraud-related research. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 32(1), 
287-321. 
 Xi, C. (2006). In search of an effective monitoring board model: board reforms and the political 
economy of corporate law in China. Connecticut Journal of International Law, 22, 1-46. 
 Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-211. 
  
  
38 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for all firm-year observations for the matched sample. Our sample period is 
2000 to 2010. All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. Panel A present the summary statistics for the whole sample of fraud and control 
firms. Panel B presents the summary statistics for fraud firms and non-fraud firms, matched on industry and firm 
size, and Panel C for SOEs and non-SOEs. 
Panel A: Industry and size matched sample 
Variables Mean Std Median Number of Obs. 
Fraud 0.151 0.358 0.000 5236 
Cash 0.704 0.462 0.607 5236 
Supervisors Share (%) 0.061 0.713 0.000 5236 
Management Shares (%) 0.880 4.857 0.004 5236 
Supervisor Board Size 4.039 1.309 3.000 5236 
Board Size 9.267 2.172 9.000 5236 
Independent (%) 0.147 0.082 0.176 5236 
Dual Role 0.850 0.357 1.000 5196 
Ownership 0.192 0.132 0.153 5236 
Market-to-Book 3.071 69.675 2.915 5236 
Leverage 0.053 0.095 0.013 5236 
RoA -0.435 29.669 0.023 5236 
Free-Cash-Flow -1.393 18.621 -0.551 5236 
Zscore 3.861 13.335 2.528 5236 
Firm Size 21.260 0.883 21.232 5236 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (continued) 
Panel B:  Industry and Size Matched Sample 
  Fraud Firms Non-Fraud Firms   
Variables Mean Std 
Number of 
Obs. 
Mean Std 
Number of 
Obs. 
Difference in 
means 
Fraud 0.302 0.459 2618 0.000 0.000 2618 
 
Cash 0.650 0.450 2618 0.757 0.468 2618 -8.4235*** 
Supervisors 
Share (%) 
0.054 0.842 2618 0.068 0.555 2618 -0.699 
Management 
Shares (%) 
0.924 6.089 2618 0.836 3.179 2618 0.656 
Supervisor 
Board Size 
4.009 1.292 2618 4.070 1.325 2618 -1.669* 
Board Size 9.186 2.227 2618 9.349 2.113 2618 -2.712** 
Independent 
(%) 
0.147 0.083 2618 0.148 0.081 2618 -0.316 
Dual Role 0.850 0.357 2596 0.849 0.358 2600 0.093 
Ownership 0.177 0.127 2618 0.207 0.135 2618 -8.256*** 
Market-to-Book 2.196 97.794 2618 3.947 12.081 2618 -0.909 
Leverage 0.052 0.103 2618 0.054 0.087 2618 -0.703 
RoA -0.065 1.086 2618 -0.805 41.945 2618 0.903 
Free-Cash-Flow -1.896 26.237 2618 -0.889 1.924 2610 -1.955* 
Zscore 3.220 16.074 2618 4.502 9.824 2618 -3.480*** 
Firm Size 21.263 0.873 2618 21.258 0.894 2618 -0.199 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (continued) 
Panel C:  Comparison of SOEs and non-SOEs   
 
SOEs Non-SOEs   
Variables Mean Std 
Number of 
Obs. 
Mean Std 
Number of 
Obs. 
Difference in 
means 
Fraud 0.151 0.359 3453 0.150 0.357 1783 0.111 
Cash  0.665 0.431 3453 0.779 0.510 1783 -8.510*** 
Supervisors Share 
(%) 
0.026 0.292 3453 0.129 1.150 1783 -4.984*** 
Management Share 
(%) 
0.297 2.859 3453 2.010 7.178 1783 -12.264*** 
Supervisor Board 
Size 
4.214 1.337 3453 3.701 1.182 1783 13.695*** 
Board Size 9.521 2.220 3453 8.777 1.986 1783 11.902*** 
Independent (%) 0.138 0.084 3453 0.166 0.076 1783 -12.128*** 
Dual Role 0.871 0.335 3428 0.808 0.394 1768 6.105*** 
Ownership 0.211 0.136 3453 0.155 0.114 1783 15.008*** 
Market-to-Book 2.758 84.435 3453 3.677 21.222 1783 -0.452 
Leverage 0.056 0.094 3453 0.047 0.098 1783 3.418*** 
RoA -0.633 36.523 3453 -0.051 1.291 1783 -0.674 
Free-Cash-Flow -1.457 19.836 3447 -1.269 16.014 1781 -0.346 
Zscore 3.900 7.648 3453 3.786 20.226 1783 0.294 
Firm Size 21.274 0.868 3453 21.235 0.912 1783 1.506 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the correlations of variables in the data. All variables are as defined in the Appendix. * indicates that correlations are statistically significant at 
least at the 5% level. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) Fraud 1 
              
(2) Cash  -0.114* 1 
             
(3) 
Supervisors Share 
(%) 
0.0062 0.0365* 1 
            
(4) 
Management Shares 
(%) 
0.0606* 0.133* 0.316* 1 
           
(5) 
Supervisor Board 
Size 
-0.0333* 0.0285* -0.0249* -0.0767* 1 
          
(6) Board Size 0.00448 0.101* -0.0383* -0.0507* 0.341* 1 
         
(7) Independent (%) -0.110* 0.389* 0.0506* 0.115* -0.231* -0.0744* 1 
        
(8) Dual Role 0.0164 0.0179 -0.0555* -0.0530* 0.0713* 0.0694* 0.00684 1 
       
(9) Ownership -0.0374* -0.0933* -0.0377* -0.0779* 0.0688* 0.0241* -0.164* 0.0605* 1 
      
(10) Market-to-Book 0.00876 -0.00537 0.00106 0.00237 0.00787 -0.00654 -0.0250* 0.0225 0.0159 1 
     
(11) Leverage -0.0486* 0.0500* -0.00623 -0.0469* 0.0604* 0.0574* 0.0161 0.022 0.0179 0.00166 1 
    
(12) RoA 0.00573 0.0181 0.00142 0.00301 0.0116 0.00294 -0.00952 0.0329* 0.0172 0.00296 0.00715 1 
   
(13) Free-Cash-Flow 0.0154 0.0211 0.00189 0.00369 -0.0115 0.0233* 0.0333* -0.0121 0.0116 0.0357* 0.00193 0.0116 1 
  
(14) Zscore -0.00413 0.00604 0.0127 0.0579* 0.00482 0.0115 -0.0858* -0.0228 0.0282* 0.0669* -0.0964* 0.0233* 0.356* 1 
 
(15) Firm Size -0.0357* 0.319* -0.00865 0.0221 0.107* 0.127* -0.191* 0.011 0.180* 0.00679 0.0827* 0.0218 -0.0223 0.117* 1 
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Table 3: Cash Pay, Equity Incentive and Fraud Activities 
This table presents results from estimating panel logistic regression of Fraud as a function of equity incentives and 
control variables. Marginal effects are shown in the table. All variables are as defined in the Appendix. Models 1-3 
present the results of Cash and Management Shares (%), and corporate governance as well as firm characteristic, 
respectively. Models 4-6 present the results of Cash, Supervisor Shares (%), and Management Shares (%), and 
corporate governance as well as firm characteristic and with all variables jointly, respectively. t-statistics are 
reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Incentive 
      
Cash -0.0341*** -0.0313** -0.0307** -0.0316** -0.0309** -0.0373*** 
 
[-2.64] [-2.48] [-2.28] [-2.50] [-2.30] [-2.79] 
Supervisors Share (%) 
   
-0.00745 -0.00812 -0.00726 
    
[-0.86] [-0.90] [-0.87] 
Management Shares (%) 0.00615*** 0.00572*** 0.00600*** 0.00605*** 0.00636*** 0.00608*** 
 
[6.97] [6.64] [6.98] [6.51] [6.86] [6.65] 
Governance 
      
Supervisor Board Size 
 
-0.0124*** 
 
-0.0122*** 
 
-0.0111*** 
  
[-3.48] 
 
[-3.45] 
 
[-3.19] 
Board Size 
 
0.000161 
 
0.000132 
 
0.000163 
  
[0.08] 
 
[0.07] 
 
[0.08] 
Independent (%) 
 
-0.0677 
 
-0.0687 
 
-0.0706 
  
[-0.61] 
 
[-0.62] 
 
[-0.65] 
Dual Role 
 
0.0126 
 
0.0123 
 
0.0117 
  
[1.16] 
 
[1.13] 
 
[1.10] 
Ownership 
 
-0.188*** 
 
-0.189*** 
 
-0.179*** 
  
[-5.66] 
 
[-5.67] 
 
[-5.29] 
Firm Characteristics 
      
Market-to-Book 
  
0.0000526 
 
0.0000524 0.0000349 
   
[0.47] 
 
[0.47] [0.61] 
Leverage 
  
-0.151** 
 
-0.150** -0.144** 
   
[-2.30] 
 
[-2.29] [-2.25] 
RoA 
  
0.000134** 
 
0.000134** 0.000149** 
   
[2.37] 
 
[2.37] [2.51] 
Free-Cash-Flow 
  
0.00635 
 
0.00637 0.00513 
   
[1.59] 
 
[1.60] [1.41] 
Zscore 
  
-0.00129* 
 
-0.00129* -0.00125 
   
[-1.69] 
 
[-1.69] [-1.64] 
Firm Size 
  
-0.00208 
 
-0.00217 0.00976 
   
[-0.33] 
 
[-0.34] [1.47] 
       Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Observations 5236 5196 5228 5196 5228 5188 
Pseudo R2  0.087 0.099 0.092 0.099 0.092 0.101 
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Table 4 : Cash Pay, Equity Incentive and Fraud Activities for State-Owned Firms 
This table presents results from estimating panel logistic regression of Fraud as a function of equity incentives and control variables 
for SOEs (State Owned Enterprises). Marginal effects are shown in the table. All variables are as defined in the Appendix. Models 1-3 
present the results of Cash and Management Shares (%), and corporate governance as well as firm characteristic, respectively. Models 
4-6 present the results of Cash, Supervisor Shares (%), and Management Shares (%), and corporate governance as well as firm 
characteristic and with all variables jointly, respectively. Models 1-3 present the results of Cash and Management Shares (%), and 
corporate governance as well as firm characteristic, respectively. Models 4-6 present the results of Cash, Supervisor Shares (%), and 
Management Shares (%), and corporate governance as well as firm characteristic and with all variables jointly, respectively. t-statistics 
are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Incentive 
      
Cash -0.0352** -0.0357** -0.0317* -0.0359** -0.0319* -0.0432** 
 
[-2.00] [-1.99] [-1.87] [-2.00] [-1.88] [-2.48] 
Supervisors Share (%) 
   
-0.00546 -0.00482 -0.00569 
    
[-0.25] [-0.24] [-0.28] 
Management Shares (%) 0.00785*** 0.00773*** 0.00700*** 0.00823*** 0.00744** 0.00730** 
 
[3.41] [3.55] [3.47] [2.63] [2.57] [2.49] 
Governance 
      
Supervisor Board Size 
 
-0.0139*** 
 
-0.0139*** 
 
-0.0112** 
  
[-2.72] 
 
[-2.72] 
 
[-2.38] 
Board Size 
 
0.00363 
 
0.00362 
 
0.00287 
  
[1.27] 
 
[1.27] 
 
[1.10] 
Independent (%) 
 
-0.148 
 
-0.148 
 
-0.127 
  
[-0.87] 
 
[-0.87] 
 
[-0.80] 
Dual Role 
 
0.0204 
 
0.0203 
 
0.0192 
  
[1.23] 
 
[1.23] 
 
[1.27] 
Ownership 
 
-0.191*** 
 
-0.192*** 
 
-0.170*** 
  
[-4.35] 
 
[-4.36] 
 
[-3.81] 
Firm Characteristics 
      
Market-to-Book 
  
0.0000137 
 
0.0000137 0.00000827 
   
[0.50] 
 
[0.50] [0.31] 
Leverage 
  
-0.180*** 
 
-0.180*** -0.165** 
   
[-2.61] 
 
[-2.61] [-2.39] 
RoA 
  
0.000148** 
 
0.000148** 0.000158*** 
   
[2.49] 
 
[2.50] [2.62] 
Free-Cash-Flow 
  
0.0227*** 
 
0.0227*** 0.0191*** 
   
[3.20] 
 
[3.21] [2.71] 
Zscore 
  
-0.00143 
 
-0.00142 -0.00133 
   
[-0.83] 
 
[-0.83] [-0.87] 
Firm Size 
  
0.00328 
 
0.00324 0.0144* 
   
[0.41] 
 
[0.41] [1.68] 
       Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Observations 3301 3278 3298 3278 3298 3275 
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.060 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.064 
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Table 5 : Cash Pay, Equity Incentive and Fraud Activities for Non-State-Owned Firms 
This table presents results from estimating panel logistic regression of Fraud as a function of equity incentives and control variables 
for non-SOEs (non-state-owned enterprises). Marginal effects are shown in the table. All variables are as defined in the Appendix. 
Models 1-3 present the results of Cash and Management Shares (%), and corporate governance as well as firm characteristic, 
respectively. Models 4-6 present the results of Cash, Supervisor Shares (%), and Management Shares (%), and corporate governance 
as well as firm characteristic and with all variables jointly, respectively. t-statistics are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Incentive 
      
Cash -0.0338* -0.0303* -0.0247 -0.0308* -0.0253 -0.0280 
 
[-1.71] [-1.67] [-1.14] [-1.69] [-1.17] [-1.36] 
Supervisors Share (%) 
   
-0.00856 -0.00998 -0.00812 
    
[-0.64] [-0.72] [-0.74] 
Management Shares (%) 0.00482*** 0.00439*** 0.00485*** 0.00466*** 0.00516*** 0.00489*** 
 
[5.27] [4.99] [5.30] [4.89] [5.22] [5.27] 
Governance 
      
Supervisor Board Size 
 
-0.0128** 
 
-0.0126** 
 
-0.0101* 
  
[-2.21] 
 
[-2.18] 
 
[-1.76] 
Board Size 
 
-0.00412 
 
-0.00414 
 
-0.00316 
  
[-1.33] 
 
[-1.34] 
 
[-0.99] 
Independent (%) 
 
-0.0124 
 
-0.0134 
 
-0.0124 
  
[-0.09] 
 
[-0.09] 
 
[-0.09] 
Dual Role 
 
0.00687 
 
0.00654 
 
0.00261 
  
[0.47] 
 
[0.44] 
 
[0.17] 
Ownership 
 
-0.192*** 
 
-0.192*** 
 
-0.182*** 
  
[-3.02] 
 
[-3.03] 
 
[-2.92] 
Firm Characteristics 
      
Market-to-Book 
  
0.000519* 
 
0.000517* 0.000453 
   
[1.88] 
 
[1.88] [1.55] 
Leverage 
  
-0.0313 
 
-0.0298 -0.0795 
   
[-0.35] 
 
[-0.34] [-0.79] 
RoA 
  
-0.00475 
 
-0.00473 -0.000960 
   
[-0.34] 
 
[-0.34] [-0.07] 
Free-Cash-Flow 
  
0.000879 
 
0.000882 0.000959 
   
[0.75] 
 
[0.76] [0.83] 
Zscore 
  
-0.000853 
 
-0.000855 -0.000970* 
   
[-1.42] 
 
[-1.44] [-1.72] 
Firm Size 
  
-0.00828 
 
-0.00829 0.00274 
   
[-0.72] 
 
[-0.73] [0.24] 
       Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Observations 1774 1763 1773 1763 1773 1766 
Pseudo R2 0.155 0.167 0.158 0.167 0.159 0.161 
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Table 6: Robustness Test 
This table presents results from estimating panel logistic regression of Fraud as a function of equity incentives and control variables. Marginal effects are shown in the table. All variables are as defined in the Appendix. 
Model 1 presents the results with the number of analysts. Model 2 presents the results with High Litigation risk (HLR) dummy. HLR is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in the computer or related manufacturing 
industry, medical manufacturing, chemical, and retail industries (Kim and Skinner, 2012). Model 3 presents the results when Firm Size > 21.4. Model 4 presents the results when Firm Size <= 21.4. Model 5 presents the 
result when Supervisory Board Size > 4. Model 6 presents the result when Supervisor Board Size <= 4. Model 7 presents the results with only considering of first fraud active of each firm. Models 8 and 9 present the results 
before and after stock split reform in 2005, respectively. Model 10 and 11 present the results for concentrated and competitive industries, respectively based on the Herfindahl Hirschman Competition Index (HHI) measure, 
where HHI (Low) and HHI (High) means that HHI is greater/equal than median value and less than the median value. Model 12 presents the results for regions with higher legal development, where MLS > 5.5, i.e. above 
the median value of the MLS index. Model 13 presents the results for regions with lower legal development, where MLS <= 5.5. t-statistics are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)  
  Analysts HLR 
Firm Size 
>21.4 
Firm Size 
<=21.4 
Supervisor 
Board 
Size>4 
Supervisor 
Board 
Size<=4 
First 
Occurrence 
Before 
Stock Split 
Reform 
After Stock 
Split Reform 
HHI (Low) 
HHI 
(High) 
MLS>5.5 MLS<=5.5 
 
Incentive 
       
    
   
Cash -0.0046 -0.037*** -0.0302** -0.0336 -0.042*** -0.0226 -0.0194*** -0.0683** 0.00897 -0.0466*** -0.0194 -0.0220 -0.0271  
 
[-0.47] [-2.80] [-2.07] [-1.46] [-2.70] [-1.23] [-3.42] [-2.21] [0.82] [-3.14] [-1.02] [-1.40] [-1.29]  
Supervisors Share 
(%) 
0.00272 -0.00744 -0.0014 -0.00949 0.0119 -0.0268 0.000551 -0.362* -0.00238 -0.00707 -0.0475* -0.0113 -0.00193 
 
 
[0.98] [-0.87] [-0.19] [-0.83] [1.11] [-1.62] [0.31] [-1.70] [-0.87] [-0.89] [-1.88] [-0.95] [-0.11]  
Management Shares 
(%) 
0.00223*** 0.0060*** 0.0056*** 0.0058*** 0.00235 0.0069*** 0.0014*** 0.00462 0.0035** 0.0059*** 0.0052*** 0.0053*** 0.0105*** 
 
 
[4.57] [6.54] [6.97] [3.10] [1.31] [6.53] [4.66] [1.03] [6.46] [6.60] [3.22] [5.45] [2.80]  
Governance 
           
   
Supervisor Board Size -0.00511* -0.012*** -0.00623* -0.017*** -0.00214 -0.0408** -0.00091 -0.02*** 0.00105 -0.013*** -0.00392 -0.00366 
-
0.0178*** 
 
 
[-1.66] [-3.29] [-1.80] [-2.62] [-0.42] [-2.36] [-0.72] [-3.34] [0.28] [-3.20] [-0.79] [-0.81] [-3.29]  
Board Size 0.00263 7.29E-06 0.00193 -0.00225 0.00431* -0.00351 0.000201 -0.00115 0.000937 -0.00253 0.00348 -0.000678 0.000781  
 
[1.44] [0.00] [0.96] [-0.62] [1.92] [-1.29] [0.28] [-0.30] [0.42] [-1.23] [1.12] [-0.25] [0.27]  
Independent (%) 0.131 -0.0718 -0.144 -0.00589 -0.228 0.0142 -0.0916* -0.21 0.186 -0.00329 -0.154 0.0390 -0.0461  
 
[1.08] [-0.66] [-1.21] [-0.03] [-1.48] [0.11] [-1.67] [-1.01] [1.13] [-0.03] [-0.97] [0.29] [-0.28]  
Dual Role -0.00294 0.0123 0.00896 0.0216 0.0142 0.00736 0.00353 0.0288 -0.00666 -0.00735 0.0412*** 0.0238* -0.00894  
 
[-0.30] [1.16] [0.76] [1.27] [1.12] [0.52] [0.85] [1.28] [-0.58] [-0.60] [2.76] [1.91] [-0.48]  
Ownership -0.0753** -0.183*** -0.228*** -0.0353 -0.126*** -0.207*** -0.0427*** -0.43*** 0.0587* -0.140*** -0.192*** -0.128*** -0.209***  
 
[-2.22] [-5.40] [-5.84] [-0.60] [-2.76] [-4.54] [-3.12] [-6.44] [1.76] [-3.31] [-4.09] [-2.84] [-4.27]  
Number of Analysts 
-0.00313* 
      
    
   
[-1.92]    
        
    
   
Firm Characteristics 
     
    
   
Market-to-Book 0.00003*** 0.000032 0.0000124 0.000108 -0.000067 0.0000636 0.000049 -0.00033 0.0000928 0.0000161 0.000354 -0.000111 0.000258  
 
[2.97] [0.58] [0.60] [0.34] [-0.44] [0.45] [0.51] [-0.57] [0.55] [0.87] [0.82] [-0.64] [0.44]  
Leverage -0.0414 -0.141** -0.0831 -0.212* -0.198*** -0.0676 -0.00427 -0.159 -0.141*** -0.240*** -0.0349 -0.106 -0.276***  
 
[-0.98] [-2.20] [-1.39] [-1.70] [-2.84] [-0.83] [-0.19] [-1.20] [-2.97] [-3.85] [-0.52] [-1.27] [-3.13]  
RoA -0.0276** 0.00014** -0.0402** 0.000214* 0.0238 0.00014** 0.00793** 0.0253 -0.00779* -0.00943 0.00014** -0.0202 0.00024**  
 [-2.24] [2.44] [-2.05] [1.78] [1.10] [2.42] [2.02] [0.66] [-1.83] [-0.57] [2.14] [-1.37] [2.43]  
Free-Cash-Flow 0.00171 0.00508 0.00391** 0.00528 0.0207*** 0.0006 0.000105 0.00432 0.00485*** 0.0126*** -0.000160 0.0169** 0.00110  
 [1.57] [1.36] [2.28] [0.70] [2.74] [0.55] [1.39] [0.68] [2.87] [2.81] [-0.05] [2.29] [0.35]  
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Table 6 continued: Robustness Test 
 
Zscore -0.0031*** -0.00122 -0.00075 -0.00175** -0.00276 -0.000561 0.00022 -0.00169 -0.000126 -0.00125 -0.00100 -0.000676 -0.00235  
 [-2.92] [-1.60] [-0.95] [-2.29] [-1.62] [-0.64] [1.61] [-0.86] [-0.28] [-1.32] [-1.23] [-0.83] [-1.38]  
Firm Size 0.00428 0.00984 0.0135 0.0229* 0.0242*** -0.0134 0.00665** 0.0247 -0.0132** 0.00757 0.0132 -0.0135* 0.0393***  
 [0.64] [1.48] [1.44] [1.67] [2.95] [-1.47] [2.45] [1.64] [-2.52] [0.96] [1.49] [-1.66] [3.75]  
High Litigation Risk  0.0111             
  [1.34]             
               
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No  
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 1429 5188 2595 2593 2261 2920 5188 2429 2756 2576 2612 2486 2556  
Pseudo R2 0.237 0.101 0.152 0.076 0.115 0.122 0.125 0.032 0.131 0.1514 0.0792 0.117 0.113  
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Table 7: Robustness Check with Full Dataset 
This table presents results from estimating panel logistic regression of Fraud as a function of equity incentives and control variables 
for the full sample. Marginal effects are shown in the table. All variables are as defined in the Appendix. Models 1 and 2 present the 
results for the full sample, models 3 and 4 present the results for SOEs, and models 5 and 6 Present those for non-SOEs. t-statistics are 
reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
  Overall State Owned Firms Non-State Owned Firms 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Incentive 
      
Cash -0.0155*** -0.0184*** -0.0210*** -0.0281*** -0.0122* -0.0108* 
 
[-3.69] [-4.45] [-3.36] [-4.51] [-1.88] [-1.78] 
Supervisors Share (%) -0.00499 -0.00509 -0.00146 -0.00247 -0.00589 -0.00582 
 
[-1.55] [-1.62] [-0.30] [-0.48] [-1.28] [-1.33] 
Management Shares (%) 0.00234*** 0.00218*** 0.00323*** 0.00311*** 0.00162*** 0.00153*** 
 
[8.13] [7.62] [3.65] [3.46] [5.51] [5.51] 
Governance 
      
Supervisor Board Size 
 
-0.00373*** 
 
-0.00566*** 
 
-0.00186 
  
[-3.97] 
 
[-3.70] 
 
[-1.37] 
Board Size 
 
-0.000327 
 
0.000597 
 
-0.00128* 
  
[-0.59] 
 
[0.65] 
 
[-1.66] 
Independent (%) 
 
-0.0301 
 
-0.0622 
 
-0.00779 
  
[-1.00] 
 
[-1.15] 
 
[-0.22] 
Dual Role 
 
0.00319 
 
0.00613 
 
0.00104 
  
[1.09] 
 
[1.17] 
 
[0.29] 
Ownership 
 
-0.0732*** 
 
-0.0960*** 
 
-0.0578*** 
  
[-7.13] 
 
[-6.20] 
 
[-3.42] 
Firm Characteristics 
      
Market-to-Book 0.0000777 0.0000424 0.0000175 0.00000676 0.000118 0.0000992 
 
[1.08] [0.59] [0.63] [0.45] [1.45] [1.19] 
Leverage -0.0470*** -0.0427** -0.0693*** -0.0638*** -0.0151 -0.0205 
 
[-2.60] [-2.41] [-3.04] [-2.77] [-0.60] [-0.75] 
RoA 0.0000322** 0.0000282* 0.0000475** 0.0000395* -0.00161 -0.00114 
 
[2.12] [1.90] [2.27] [1.92] [-0.78] [-0.47] 
Free-Cash-Flow 0.00157*** 0.00166*** 0.00226*** 0.00253*** 0.000769 0.000678 
 
[2.93] [3.28] [2.61] [2.72] [0.63] [0.66] 
Zscore -0.000419** -0.000434** -0.000541 -0.000503 -0.000323** -0.000351** 
 
[-2.25] [-2.10] [-1.42] [-1.06] [-2.05] [-2.25] 
Firm Size -0.0115*** -0.00684*** -0.0148*** -0.00779*** -0.00910*** -0.00675*** 
 
[-6.88] [-4.03] [-6.05] [-2.84] [-3.46] [-2.73] 
       Industry Fixed-Effects Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Observations 13006 12921 8062 8008 4437 4423 
R-squared 0.135 0.142 0.097 0.100 0.204 0.210 
 
 
